Israel July 10

Back to Gaza, maybe big changes

As the amazement with the remarkable pager and walkie-talkie attacks against Hezbollah, and 12 Day War with Iran have been replaced with the open sore of the war with Hamas in Gaza. Several opinion pieces in the Israeli press and several podcasts (Dan Senor, Haviv Rettig Gur) have focused on the 22 month war and the accumulating burden on the nation. The repeated theme is the continued absence of a strategy- the absence of a real outcome that can be achieved that will deliver a satisfactory end to the war.

The government called for the destruction of Hamas, yet operations have not been conducted to deliver that as an outcome. Portions of Gaza have not been entered by the IDF, despite the scale and scope of combat, and many areas have had operations repeated two, three, even four times.

US observers have called for the U.S. executed strategy in Iraq of Clear, Hold, Build. That takes a commitment, it requires the one things Israel is loathe to do- occupy Gaza in order to pacify the territory and population in order to build something new, something that is not Hamas, not the movement that sustains Hamas.

The IDF has expanded the territory it occupies, and continues to move the population, now doing a more extensive job of finding tunnels, destroying infrastructure, but there is no idea of what comes next. This is being done against the backdrop of not just the success against Iran, but the growing pressure from Trump to see that part of the war brought to a conclusion- irrespective of what that may look like.

Unlike Shia Iran and Hezbollah, both of whom have been soundly defeated and set back, Sunni Hamas remains committed to the fight. They have lost above 90% of their leadership, over half, maybe 2/3 of their combat forces, and yet the fight continues. Leaders are less experienced and capable, forces are less experienced, organized and capable, but they continue to fight.

This may be a difference between Shia and Sunni- the Dan Senor episode talking through Shiism and the divergent nature of the Iranian regime’s approach to Shiism. Even as Hamas continues to be degraded and turn to things like the IED, IDF casualties continue. The Taliban who rolled into Kabul was either not born or toddlers when we arrived after 9/11. This version of Hamas may not be the version of Oct 7, but it is Hamas and is fighting.

There are comments about Hamas being at the point of destruction, but that still remains to be seen. It is 22 months of destroying Hamas and the burden on the nation is really monumental. A metric case may be made Israel is well past the point of diminishing returns.

There have been comments about Hamas seeking to abound being removed from Gaza like the PLO experience of removal from Beirut in the early 1980’s, I am not quite sure, even as they seek to avoid being defeated. The Beirut departure became a PLO victory parade, and I think Hamas vacating Gaza will look like the return of the hostages- “made for TV.” They seem, even absent the long established figures, and now run by who knows who, to still be setting the terms of the negotiations- not quite broken, I think.

This was always going to be hard. Destroying was never likely to be an outcome because Israel could not do what was required, and that is occupy. They are doing more of that, and we will see how this plays out, but the pressure from Trump, duration of the war, continuation of casualties for what looks like less and less actual progress, and still has no clarity of end state or outcome, and the hostages, is building pressure.

Even the new Chief of Staff seems to have changed his mind on what he thought he could do as he came into office.

Their tactics have not fed an operational plan leading to a strategic goal that can deliver an outcome that allows Israel to move on to the next chapter. For 22 months destruction was just around the corner, and as we observe the activities, we in the US have little visibility and sense of the accumulating burden on the nation and its impact on the government and war.

Two major items appeared in the last several days. The U.S. described Hezbollah as a militia, a militant group and a political party with elected representation in the Lebanese government, rather than a terrorist organization. There is a practical dimension of identifying things as they are- Nixon on the borders of Europe and the CCP controlling China was more about fact than policy.

Our deference to Hezbollah as such accords a terror group recognition. Israel created a narrative and formed de facto recognition of Hamas as a governing body, leading to missing and avoiding the warnings of the attacks of Oct 7. Hamas has been engaged in a shooting war with Israel, finally knuckling under after devastating attacks; this war and the previous wars have been separate from the government of Lebanon, and at the expense of the people of Lebanon. Israel seeks to avoid giving Hamas a picture and message of victory in Gaza, but we seem to be giving one to Hezbollah.

Of course Hamas won an election in 2006, to the surprise and chagrin of the state department. US recognition undermines our policy towards other terror groups, and the space we offer Hezbollah at any table comes at the expense of the government of Lebanon. They are not an ally of, or benefit to, Lebanon, and this makes the things the government of Lebanon needs to do much harder- Hezbollah consumes Lebanon, and does not help the country solve its problems or grow.

Conversely, and coming seemingly out of nowhere, and not a consequence of anything we are directly doing, is this rise of the potential Emirate of Hebron. This will not be easy, but it can sever the PA from the majority of those living in the West Bank, and undercut its position of control. This may be a chance to start of process of peaceful resolution in the West Bank, and gives the Arab nations- Saudi Arabia- the opportunity to meet their requirement for a “state” that is not a cover for a terror organization.

This will be a long road, and one that will be the target of terrorists who see their hold on power at risk, but if this gets traction, with the damage to Iran, this can change the landscape. As well as giving Saudi Arabia a viable political object towards normalization with Israel, this can help dry up Iranian terror support flowing through Jordan, putting Jordan at risk.

What is notable is this is organic to the region, and not a western answer to a problem the west does not understand. This will be the object of resistance from the UN, much of the EU, and much of the US- those invested in the way things have been done for decades.

Trump broke the status quo and conventional mindset with Israel and the Abraham Accords in the first term. His willingness to allow Israel to attack Iran and then join the attack repeats that shattering of conventional wisdom. Recognition of Hezbollah as something other than a terror organization does the same thing, but not one that doe not advance peace and security for Israel or the mid-East.