A Case for NATO
“The answer is Euro-Atlantic integration; the question doesn’t matter.”
NATO received Trump 1.0 with resentment from his criticism of post-Cold War evolution and the reality of the unfairness of European burden sharing- the correctness of his position revealed with increases in defense spending within the alliance. A marked different response to Trump 2.0 in the aftermath of the failure of deterrence (through weakness) with Russia in 2022, and the resolve, skills and capabilities displayed in the strikes against Iran.
We seem to be presented with a stark binary choice between Europe and the Pacific in competition for resources and attention- which makes no strategic sense, even as we reconsider priorities and realignment of resources. As see in the Levant, the world in which the US operates is not easily bifurcated. US economic, social, and cultural ties to Europe are extensive and will not manage on their own nor on the margin, regardless of where our priority interest may lie. The US benefits greatly by Euro-Atlantic stability, and should stability unravel, the US will be required to reestablish it- whether alone from the eastern seaboard, or in partnership with allies and a solid presence on the European continent.
Truth in advertising, commissioned in 1976, I am a Cold War warrior. I had direct dealings with the Russians in the 2006 period serving in US European Command, still on their heels, but a half-decade into Putin, regaining their footing- and actively interfering with everything we were doing in Eurasia, the Caucuses, and Central Asia.
Russia is objectively an adversary who seeks to reset the US-led world order to diminish US influence and power. The invasion of Georgia and Ukraine, murders of political opponents in Russia and abroad, and sabotage against Western European defense industries point to the nature of the regime- as did the brutality of the conduct of military operations in the wars in Chechnya, Syria and now Ukraine. Like the USSR during the Cold War, neither war with Russia nor not dealing with them is the answer, but it does drive the fundamentals of the relationship.
NATO is a post-World War II political alliance formed in response to the threat of the Soviet Union and manifested in a series of civil wars and political challenges in Western European capitals between communists, socialists and democratic forces. The Article V defensive clause for member nations closed the circle begun with the Marshall Plan. Despite revisionist questions of the impact of the amount of money committed by the US, what cannot be challenged is the commitment to rebuilding Western Europe in the aftermath of war, which genuinely exceeded the value of the money by itself. NATO took the next step in the rebuild of Western Europe, directly committing the US to its defense.
The formation of NATO in April 1949, and the unraveling of the Warsaw Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 bracketed the most significant step by NATO: West Germany’s membership in 1955. Its welcome into the community of western nations was precipitated by the acceptance of settled borders- with ally France, adversary Poland, and neutral Austria- and functioning democratic, representative governance. This was a fundamental redirection of the nature of European nations and the source of episodic distractions and war.
While there is debate over enlargement and promises that may have been made by the Bush administration to Yeltsin and his government, actual enlargement has been done through the established political protocols of the alliance. Done over a half dozen times, some stand out. The first enlargement in 1999 included Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; all three suffered under Soviet-led interference, crushing nascent freedom movements rising against Moscow. 2004 brought the three former Soviet Socialist Republics of the Baltic nations occupied by the Soviets after World War II.
2004 and 2009 saw the entry of new nations created with the dissolution of the Tito dictatorship in Yugoslavia- and the genocide and ethnic cleansing that followed. Significant in the Balkan enlargement, like Germany, was the commitment to settled borders and democratic governance. NATO does not need the army of North Macedonia, but benefits from the settling of disputes in a region that sparked World War I. What remains of Balkan instability is contained to nations outside of NATO.
Most recently in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was the movement to entry of formerly neutral Finland and Sweden. (For those who worry about NATO’s extended border to defend against Russia, it is obvious the failure of the Russian military in Ukraine and the impressive performance of western military skill and systems in Iran, that Russia is the loser in that outcome. Sweden and Finland have advanced western militaries; as NATO members they close the gap in NATO’s boundaries to Norway; the Nordic countries have advanced their own operational integration to levels that in ways surpass NATO members; and rather than Kaliningrad being a dagger pointed into a vulnerable gap within NATO, it is now isolated with the Baltic Sea just about sealed. Advantage NATO.)
The problems with NATO, and Trump 1.0 comments and positions, echoed his predecessors going back to Reagan. The weakness of NATO has not been limited to burden sharing, but dates to resisting the deployment of Pershing II and other intermediate range missiles initiated by Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in order to counter Soviet intermediate nuclear systems deployed into Eastern Europe. It seemed many NATO nations had given up on their own defense, the last struggle waged in the parliaments of Western Europe between advocates of the Soviet “Peace Offensive” and “peaceful coexistence” with Pershing II.
From Reagan through Obama, and then to Biden, presidents were uniform in their criticism and pushing of NATO. NATO operations not led by the US, or NATO member operations absent the US, sputter, as in Libya in 2011- “leading from behind” became leading, period. That reality serves neither Europe nor the US, and Trump pressured NATO as it had never seen before, seeking to change the fundamentals- his efforts benefitted by the Russian war in Ukraine and the dominant performance of western military capabilities against Russian systems in Iran.
The contest to change the world order is evident, and from the perspective of those seeking change, understandable. But that change is not to the advantage of the US nor its allies and partners. Russia as an adversary or (deadly) competitor does not call for conflict, but it does call for preparedness- sufficient to deter conflict. If (deadly) competition turns to conflict, the US is vastly better off established on the European continent with strong, capable partners. That, however, is not determined solely by the US. Our allies have a say, but the security benefit to them is not limitless (unlike China-Russia?). If the relationship becomes disadvantageous for the US, security can be managed from the east coast- the relationship will be determined far more by NATO members than any adversary NATO or the US may face.
The US benefits greatly from Euro-Atlantic stability with a sound economic, security and geo-political relationship with Europe, which as of now is anchored in NATO- with all of its included problems. There is nothing Russia can offer to offset that value proposition, and the US will be in a much poorer state should the US-led world order shift away from our leadership and move to an environment more readily dominated by authoritarian and totalitarian states, and degradation of NATO advances that risk. (A great commentary by CDR Salamander at:
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